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I. INTRODUCTION 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????1 However, the current struggle to define child pornography in our 
technologically-????????? ???? ????????????? ????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ????? ??? ?????????
pornography with a glance is not a viable option for defining child pornography today.2
This comment tracks the development of child pornography law, specifically focusing on 
morphed child pornography and Oklahoma law. Morphed child pornography is distinct 
from images of children engaging in sexual acts, or depictions of virtual children engaging 
in sexual acts.3 Rather, morphed child pornography consists of otherwise innocent images 
of real children edited to appear as though the child is engaged in a sexual act.4 Ultimately, 
????? ???????? ??????? ???????????????? ?????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ???
updated to include morphed child pornography thereby protecting the children that are 
exploited in these types of images.5
Part II provides a brief overview of the history of child pornography. This section 
provides the context necessary to understand the interactions between the multifaceted 
definitions of child pornography and the law. Specifically, this part defines morphed child 
pornography by comparing and contrasting morphed child pornography with other 
categorical definitions, including virtual child pornography and lewd child pornography. 
Part III explains the interaction of child pornography and the law in the United 
States, both at the federal and state level. The evolution of obscenity laws is tracked along 
with its relationship to child pornography law. The interaction of child pornography law 
and the First Amendment is discussed. 
????? ??? ??????????? ??????????? ???????? ????????? ?????? ????????????? ??????????
whether or not the morphed variety legally constitutes child pornography. It utilizes 
different tools of statutory construction to answer this question, looking at the legislative 
intent behind this section in the criminal code and the plain meaning of the words in the 
statute. This part also addresses the treatment of child pornography at the state level, noting 
the different statutory definitions of child pornography and whether morphed child 
pornography is included in those definitions. 
Part V argues that morphed child pornography should fall within any definition of 
child pornography. After addressing the harms and exploitation caused by morphed 
images, this part concludes that morphed child pornography should be included in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
language needed to broaden Oklahom??????????????????????????????????????????????
II. TYPES OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
While recent developments in technology have continued to create new conversation 
and controversy about child pornography, the existence of child pornography predates 
                                                          
 1. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 2. MONIQUE MATTEI FERRARO & EOGHAN CASEY, INVESTIGATING CHILD EXPLOITATION AND 
PORNOGRAPHY: THE INTERNET, THE LAW AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 237 (2005). 
 3. CARMEN M. CUSACK, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 188 (2015). 
 4. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002). 
5. See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A). 
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 83 Side A      03/03/2020   13:59:43
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 83 Side A      03/03/2020   13:59:43
C M
Y K
BEACHAM, C - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2020 6:57 AM 
2020] METAMORPHOSIS 313 
even the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century.6 For example, paintings 
depicting sexual activity between men and young boys have been discovered in ancient 
Greek civilizations.7 In addition, written pornography describing sexual acts with children 
has survived from seventeenth-century France and England.8 Indeed, it has been said that 
??????????????????????????????? ???????????? ????????????????????????????????? ???????????
???????????????????9
Advancements in technology have greatly increased the production and distribution 
of child pornography. With the invention of the camera in the early nineteenth century, the 
pornography industry boomed, and with it, child pornography.10 The relationship between 
technology and pornography continues today. Significant changes in technology can shift 
the creation and distribution of child pornography in a matter of years.11 Rapid 
advancement in technology led to a proliferation of child pornography.12 These 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
created a context in which defining child pornography is a challenging task.13
A. The Difficulty of Defining Child Pornography 
For a number of reasons, including advancements in technology, a succinct and clear 
definition of child porn???????? ?????????????????????????????????-descript diagnosis is a 
poor default.14 Attempting to define child pornography while considering all the resulting 
implications is a muddy task. Accordingly, the challenges of defining child pornography 
were highlighted at the First World Congress Against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation 
of Children: 
The question of what constitutes child pornography is extraordinarily complex. Standards 
that are applied in each society or country are highly subjective and are contingent upon 
different moral, cultural, sexual, social and religious beliefs that do not readily translate into 
law. Even if we confine ourselves to a legal definition of child pornography, the concept is 
elusive. Legal definitions of . . ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
among legal jurisdictions within the same country.15
As the above quote illustrates, questions remain regarding the type of image that 
constitutes child pornography.16 Subtle differences among statutory definitions within the 
United States provide more evidence of this challenge.17 Ultimately, advancements in 
                                                          
 6. IAN O?DONNELL & CLAIRE MILNER, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: CRIME, COMPUTERS AND SOCIETY 3 (2007). 
7. Id.
8. Id.
 9. TIM TATE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AN INVESTIGATION 33?34 (1990). 
 10. O?DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 4. 
 11. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Introduction, in REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND 
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 1, 1 (Carissa Byrne Hessick ed., 2016). 
12. Id.
13. Id.
 14. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 15. O?DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 65. 
 16. Hessick, supra note 11, at 1. 
17. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A) (?[E]ngaged in any act . . . of sexual intercourse . . . ??), CAL.
PENAL CODE § 311.11(a) (?[D]epicts a person under 18 years of age personally engaging in or simulating sexual 
conduct . . . ??), and FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5) (?[I]nclude any sexual conduct by a child.?), with 18 U.S.C. §
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technology spur unique and creative ways to accomplish the seediest of tasks and, 
accordingly, require state legislatures to continually develop the law. Because each 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
make sure its definition continues to encompass the types of child pornography that fall 
within the safety of legal loopholes created by technology, the internet, and computers.18
While there might be differences in the many legal definitions, there is a common 
understanding about some core principles. Perhaps Justice Stewart was expressing this 
commonality, and not the technical challenges, when offering his description. 
Pornography was first defined in 1857 in the Oxford English Dictionary.19 The depiction 
of sex and sexual activities is at the center.20 An overly simplistic definition of child 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? in a sexually 
????????? ????????21 Pornography is generally thought to be a depiction of consensual 
sex.22 This view provides the great dividing line between pornography and child 
pornography. All fifty states and the federal government have laws establishing an age of 
consent for sexual activity.23 Therefore, because children lack the capacity to consent to 
sexual activities, an image showing sexual acts involving a child is by definition an image 
of child abuse.24 This element of consent provides an explanatio?? ??? ??? ???? ????????
definitions of child pornography are premised on the basis of the harm that is caused to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????25
As a result, an image of a child engaging in sexual acts falls within the definition of 
child pornography in all fifty state jurisdictions and the federal law.26 The current debate 
regarding the definition of child pornography is not focused on these images of traditional 
child pornography. Not only is this type of child pornography clearly included in any 
possible definition, it is the type of child pornography possessed by most offenders.27 A 
                                                          
2256(8)(C) (?[S]uch visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor 
is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.?). 
 18. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 8. 
19. Id.
 20. MAX TAYLOR & ETHEL QUAYLE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: AN INTERNET CRIME 22 (2003). 
 21. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 8. 
 22. ALISDAIR A. GILLESPIE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: LAW AND POLICY 2, 22 (2011). 
 23. MacKenzie Smith, Note, You Can Touch, But You Can’t Look: Examining the Inconsistencies of Our Age 
of Consent and Child Pornography Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 859, 863 (2014). 
 24. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 22. The North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) is an 
example of an organization that rejects this basic premise, stating that its ?goal is to end the extreme oppression 
of men and boys in mutually consensual relationships by . . . educating the general public on the benevolent 
nature of man/boy love.? NAMBLA, Who We Are, https://www.nambla.org/welcome.html (last visited Oct. 27, 
2018). 
 25. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 22. 
26. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A) (?[E]ngaged in any act . . . of sexual intercourse . . . ??); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 311.11(a) (?[D]epicts a person under 18 years of age personally engaging in simulating sexual conduct 
. . . ??); FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5) (?[I]nclude any sexual conduct by a child.?); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (?[S]uch 
visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.?); see also Smith, supra note 23, at 864; Nat?l Ctr. for the Prevention of Child Abuse, Child 
Pornography Statutes, NAT?L DIST. ATT?Y?S ASS?N (June 2010), https://ndaa.org/wp-content/uploads/Child-
Pornography-Statutory-Compilation-6-
2010.pdf?click=Child%20Pornography%20%E2%80%94%20Comprehensive%20(updated%20June%202010). 
 27. JANIS WOLAK, KIMBERLY MITCHELL & DAVID FINKELHOR, INTERNET SEX CRIMES AGAINST MINORS:
THE RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 9?10 (2003). 
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2003 study determined that eighty percent of offenders had images of children being 
sexually penetrated.28
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????isely fits within the definition, 
not only in official statutes, but also in the minds of those who agree with Justice Stewart. 
However, there are images of children that do not fit perfectly into this bright-line 
??????????????????????? ??????????? ??? ?????Beyond the traditional understanding of child 
pornography, three other categories will help to clarify the complexity of this issue. 
B. Lewd Exhibition 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????als.29 In these instances, it is not required that there be a depiction of a 
sex act, but mere child nudity.30 Therefore, lewd images, while not specifically images of 
????????? ??????????? ??? ??????? ????????? ??? ???? ????? ??????? ???????????? ??? ??????
pornography. For example, Oklahoma law states that child pornography includes the 
???????????????????? ????????????????????31 The reason to include this type of image is 
obvious: the elements of consent are equally applied to an image of a child who cannot 
consent to engaging in sex or cannot consent to taking off their clothes and exposing their 
body in order to sexually stimulate the viewer. 
However, apparently innocent family photos might include pictures of partially 
clothed or naked children in a bathtub or other family contexts. In fact, this definition has 
led to the prosecution of parents who have taken photos of their children in bathtubs.32
????? ????? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ???????????? ??????? ??? ????????? ??????
?????????????33 ???????????? ???? ??????????? ???????? ?? ???????????? ??????????? ??? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
difficult task.34 It is certainly more difficult than determining whether a photo displays a 
child being sexually assaulted.35 The Dost test was developed to help answer these 
questions.36 The Dost test lists several factors that assist a court in determining whether or 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????37
While some have argued that this test is overbroad and therefore unconstitutional, 
the breadth of this particular branch in most child pornography definitions remains 
flexible.38 This particular type of child pornography interacts with technology because 
                                                          
 28. Id. at 10. 
 29. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A) (?[L]ewd exhibition of uncovered genitals . . . ??); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2256(2)(A)(v) (?[L]ascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area . . . ??). 
30. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v). 
31. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A). 
 32. See, e.g., LYNN POWELL, FRAMING INNOCENCE: A MOTHER?S PHOTOGRAPHS, A PROSECUTOR?S ZEAL,
AND A SMALL TOWN?S RESPONSE 20?21 (2010) (telling the story of a mother who was prosecuted for taking 
photos of her bathing daughter). 
 33. Amy Adler, The “Dost Test” in Child Pornography Law, in REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW:
CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 81, 86 (Carissa Byrne Hessick ed., 2016). 
34. Id.
 35. Id.
 36. Id. at 87. 
 37. United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 2011). 
 38. Adler, supra note 33, at 99. 
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photoshopping and cropping can be a factor in determining whether a particular photo 
qualifies as a lewd exhibition of nudity.39 In other words, photo editing might be the 
difference between an innocent family photo and child pornography.40
C. Virtual 
Virtual child pornography is dissimilar to the other types because it is neither a photo 
??? ??? ??????? ?????? ????????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ??????? ???????? ?????? ?????????41 Rather than 
utilizing a real child, some pornographic images are completely computer generated or 
utilize adults depicted as minors.42 Increasingly realistic images are more prolific because 
of advancing technology.43 ??????? ???????????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????44
This type of imagery is common in Japan, where comic books (manga) are 
popular.45 A specific variety of manga that includes the most graphic content is known as 
hentai.46 These artistic drawings or computer-generated images show children engaging 
in sex and sexual activity. However, the content was not created with the use of a child, 
leading to the creation of a different category of child pornography. 
D. Morphed 
Morphed47 child pornography is created when an innocent photo of an actual child 
is edited to make it appear as though the child is engaging in a sexual act.48 It is the cutting 
and pasting of body parts?bringing together innocent and explicit images?that 
constitutes this unique type of child pornography.49 The method of morphing can be 
accomplished through a variety of means ranging from rudimentary scissors and glue to 
sophisticated computer editing programs.50 The distinction between virtual and morphed 
child pornography, while both employ technology to create or edit images, is important to 
understand these categories. The use of an actual child is the paramount difference.51
Morphed child pornography is created by combining a variety of components.52
                                                          
 39. See State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d 128, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). 
 40. See generally id.
 41. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002). 
 42. Chelsea McLean, Note, The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legislation, 17 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL?Y 221, 224 (2007). 
43. Id. at 223. 
 44. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 100. 
 45. O?DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 66. 
 46. Id.
 47. The word ?morphed? is not the only term used to describe the types of manipulated images described 
here. Other commentators use the labels ?spliced? or ?rendered.? See GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 100. ?Pseudo-
images? is another label. See SUZANNE OST, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL GROOMING: LEGAL AND 
SOCIETAL RESPONSES 124 (2009). However, ?morphed? is the term commonly used and adopted by the Supreme 
Court and circuit courts. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 242 (2002); United States v. 
Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729?30 (2nd Cir. 2011); United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir. 2005) . 
 48. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 237; Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242. 
49. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242. 
 50. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 237. 
 51. Id.
 52. Id.
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Images of real children can be taken from virtually any source; the internet, magazines, 
etc. These photos of real children can then be edited to depict children engaging in sexual 
acts or situations. Some of these images can be made with photoshop or practically any 
other editing software.53 This is a different level of photo editing than the common social 
media filters on Instagram or Snapchat. Rather than changing the shade of colors or 
incorporating a fictional face, morphed child pornography slices and splices the photos 
until the images reveal actual children appearing to engage in sex. Morphed child 
pornography does not polish or tone photos of children, but rather edits photos together to 
create a single explicit photo. 
The following are two common examples of morphed child pornography. First, 
consider a photo of a child innocently eating an ice cream cone. The child is not engaging 
in sex or showing their exposed genitals. However, a pornographer can take that photo and 
edit it significantly, replacing the ice cream cone by superimposing a photo of an actual 
penis in place of the ice cream cone. Now, post-production, the child appears to be 
engaging in a sex act.54
Second, consider a photo of an innocent child. That photo is cropped to consist of 
only the face of the child. Next, the pornographer places that cropped image on the body 
of a pornographic photo of a naked adult. Certainly, the child was not engaging in sexual 
acts at the time the innocent photo was taken, but now the image of the child shows a 
depiction of a sexual act committed upon a child.55
Morphed child pornography is dissimilar to both virtual and traditional child 
pornography. It is divergent from traditional child pornography because no child was 
engaged in sexual activity even though the photo is altered to depict such acts.56 It is 
distinct from virtual child pornography because a real child is the subject of the 
??????????????? ??????and presumably?pleasure.57 However, advancements in the 
technology facilitating life-like photo edits will confuse this distinction.58 With the blur 
between the different categories of child pornography, jurisdictions must define child 
pornography with precision. 
III. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 
This Part addresses the interaction between child pornography and the law. Focusing 
first on the federal level, it explores the relationship between child pornography, obscenity, 
and the First Amendment, providing a necessary foundation for a discussion of the recent 
??????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
of morphed child pornography follows. 
A. Early Developments 
While child pornography might have ancient origins, laws against child pornography 
                                                          
 53. Id.
 54. Id.
 55. FERRARO & CASEY, supra note 2, at 238. 
56. Id. at 237. 
57. Id.; TAYLOR & QUAYLE, supra note 20, at 37. 
 58. O?DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 91. 
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are relatively recent.59 California was the first state to pass a law prohibiting individuals 
from using a minor in connection with the preparation or distribution of obscene matter in 
1961.60 But it took nearly ten years to expand awareness of child pornography. The 1970s 
was a notable decade for the expansion not only of child pornography, awareness of child 
pornography, and child sexual abuse, but also of laws prohibiting child pornography.61
Some believe that the first real awareness of child pornography came in September 1975 
in New York City during the preparation for the 1976 Democratic Convention.62 The 
administration started a clean-up campaign targeting sex shops; four shops in particular 
were known to sell child pornography.63 Because of the media attention on the 
Convention, the issue of child pornography was spotlighted.64
The media focus on child pornography in the latter half of the 1970s snowballed. In 
1977, the Chicago Tribune ???????????????????????????????????????????????????65 The New 
York Times printed twenty-seven articles focused on child exploitation in 1977.66 On May 
15, 1977, CBS news program 60 Minutes ???????????????????????? ??????? ???????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????67 It is no surprise that one member 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? . . 
All of a sudden there it was. In newspapers, in Time magazine, on television, and 
inevitably, on the House floor. The revelations were shocking and disgusting. Children, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????68
In 1978, Congress enacted a new federal statute, the Protection of Children Against 
Sexual Exploitation.69 This new law banned the use of children in the production of child 
pornography connected to interstate or foreign commerce.70 Before the statute was passed 
it was possible to purchase more than 250 different child pornography magazines in the 
United States.71 While more than four decades of legal development have passed since 
????? ?????? ????? ???? ???????????? ?????????????????? ??? ???? ????? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ???
relates to morphed child pornography.72
B. Child Pornography, Obscenity, and the First Amendment 
Ordinarily, the First Amendment provides protection for speech.73 However, the 
                                                          
 59. Hessick, supra note 11, at 2. 
60. Id.
 61. O?DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 15. 
62. Id. at 16. 
63. Id.
64. Id.
 65. Hessick, supra note 11, at 3. 
 66. O?DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 17. 
67. Id.
 68. Hessick, supra note 11, at 3. 
 69. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251). 
70. Id.
 71. JOHN CREWDSON, BY SILENCE BETRAYED: SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA 243 (1988). 
 72. Hessick, supra note 11, at 1. 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Supreme Court has created exceptions for obscenity and child pornography.74 The 
obscenity exception predates that of child pornography.75 Obscenity is not identical to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????icate the distinction is not robust.76 The 
???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????77 The rudimentary test as applied by the Jacobellis ??????????????????
to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme 
??????? ??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????78 The Supreme Court refined 
its definition of unprotected obscenity in Miller v. California. The Miller Court concluded 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????????? ????? ???????? ???????? ????????? ????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest[;] . . . (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value.79
However, at the time of Miller, the Supreme Court had not yet addressed child 
???????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????????? ?????????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????80
Some commentators believe this resulted from the weighty protection applied to speech 
by the Supreme Court during this time.81 This changed in 1982, ten years after Miller.
Perhaps as a response to the substantial media attention to the issues of child exploitation 
and child pornography, there was a massive legislative response.82 States began to ban 
child pornography within the current obscenity framework, not wanting to push past the 
established obscenity exception to the First Amendment.83 However, it is important to 
note that mere possession of obscene materials is protected by the First Amendment.84 In 
other words, states targeting child pornography as obscenity could not ban child 
pornography possession. That is, until states like New York made the legal distinction 
between child pornography and obscenity. 
New York distinguished between child pornography and obscenity by adopting a 
statute that criminalized the production and distribution of child pornography, separate 
from a statute criminalizing the distribution of obscene material.85 This differentiation was 
                                                          
74. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982). 
75. Roth, decided in 1957, preceded Ferber, decided in 1982, by twenty-five years. 
76. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487. 
 77. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964). 
78. Id. at 191. 
 79. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1972) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). 
 80. James Weinstein, The Context and Content of New York v. Ferber, in REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 19, 24 (Carissa Byrne Hessick ed., 2016). 
81. Id.
 82. Id. (stating that ?(1) twelve states prohibited only the production of child pornography; (2) fifteen states 
and the federal government prohibited the distribution of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct 
but only if the material also met the Miller standard for obscenity; and (3) twenty states, including New York, 
prohibited distribution of child pornography if it was not legally obscene?). 
 83. Hessick, supra note 11, at 3. 
 84. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). 
 85. Hessick, supra note 11, at 3?4; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749?50 (1982). 
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the catalyst for the Supreme Court to consider whether or not child pornography, separate 
from the obscenity exception, is protected by the First Amendment. 
In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court held that child pornography, depictions 
of ??????? ????????? ???????? ??? ????????? ??????? ????????? ??? ??????????????? ??????? ??? ??????
??????????????????????86 Ferber ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????87 The Court 
cautiously stated its natural hesitancy to promote censorship.88 However, the Court 
ultimately rejected the Miller test to evaluate the constitutionality of child pornography 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of pornographic 
????????????????????????89 The Ferber Court essentially drew a line in the sand, carving a 
category for child pornography distinct from obscenity. This was clearly a defining 
moment in the relationship between child pornography and the law. Rather than use the 
traditional obscenity exception to the First Amendment, the Court created a new exception 
to the First Amendment for this type of material. 
The Ferber Court listed several reasons for stripping First Amendment protections 
from child pornography. First, the Court reasoned that the use of children in pornography 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????90 Second, the 
distribution of such images is related to the sexual abuse of children.91 The images are a 
permanent record?and exacerbator?of the harm experienced.92 Third, the distribution, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ??????????????????
?????????????????????93 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????f not 
de minimis??94 The Court therefore justified the exclusion of child pornography from the 
protections of the First Amendment as a unique class of materials because of its express 
connection to the harming of children.95
The Ferber Court also provided specific guidelines for child pornography laws. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
must be described and defined.96 However, because the Miller test does not apply to child 
pornography?? ???? ??????? ???????? ????? ???? ????? ???? ?????????? ????????? ??? ??????????
???????????97 Even with these limited instructions, the Court did something remarkable in 
First Amendment jurisprudence by creating a category exempt from the First Amendment 
based on a harm-in-production theory. In other words, child pornography is unprotected 
by the Constitution because of the harm caused to children during the creation of child 
                                                          
 86. Weinstein, supra note 80, at 19 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756). 
 87. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753. 
 88. Id. at 756 (?[L]aws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run the risk of suppressing 
protected expression by allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy.?). 
 89. Id.
90. Id. at 758. 
91. Id. at 759. 
92. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. 
93. Id. at 761. 
94. Id. at 762. 
95. Id. at 756, 759. 
96. Id. at 764. 
 97. Ferber, 485 U.S. at 764. 
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pornography and subsequent distribution.98 Notice that this harm is not explicitly linked 
to a lack of consent by minor children in sexual activities, but it is obviously central to its 
foundation. 
Ferber??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
expanded in Osborne v. Ohio. In Osborne, the Supreme Court held that Ohio could 
prohibit the possession of child pornography.99 Because possession of obscene material is 
not illegal,100 this holding provides another distinction between obscene materials and 
child pornography. While it would be paternalistic to prohibit the viewing of obscene 
?????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ??? ????? ?????? ???????????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ????
psychological well-being of . . ????????????101 Therefore, the Court utilized the harm-in-
production logic of Ferber to ban possession of child pornography. 
C. The CPPA: Congress’ Attempt to Ban Virtual and Morphed Child Pornography
Before 1996, both virtual and morphed child pornography were left unaddressed by 
federal law.102 ??????? ????? ?????? ????? ??????? ?????????????? ???? ?????? ??? ????????? ??? ????
production or dissemination of pornography involving minors was the sine qua non of the 
???????????????????103 That is, until Congress passed the Child Pornography Protection 
Act of 1996 (CPPA).104 This new federal definition of child pornography stepped beyond 
the scope of Ferber??? ????-in-production boundaries by including both virtual and 
morphed pornography in its definition.105 Congress crafted the CPPA to include virtual 
child pornography in its definition, reacting to the computer technology that makes virtual 
child pornography possible.106 Section 2256(8)(B) of the CPPA defined child 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
computer or computer-??????????????????????????????????????or is indistinguishable from,
that of a mi???????????????????????????????????????????107 ?????????????????????????????
the opportunity for the United States Supreme Court to consider the definition of child 
pornography in light of the First Amendment, obscenity, and Ferber. Ultimately, the 
provisions proscribing virtual child pornography were held unconstitutional by Ashcroft v. 
Free Speech Coalition.108
The Ashcroft Court held that virtual pornography was not child pornography as 
defined by Ferber because no actual children were involved in the production of these 
                                                          
98. Id. at 758?59. 
 99. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
100. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). 
 101. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109. 
 102. YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSES 97 (2008). 
 103. Free Speech Coal. v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 104. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256); Brian Yamada, Note, Pornoshopped: Why California Should Adopt the Federal 
Standard for Child Pornography, 32 L.A. ENT. L. REV. 229, 232 (2011). 
 105. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (including virtual child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (including 
morphed child pornography). 
 106. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002). 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (emphasis added). 
108. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256. 
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images.109 Ashcroft stated that the statute banned a substantial amount of materials that 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????110 This 
connection between child pornography and the sexual abuse of children was the bedrock 
of the Ferber ?????????????????????????????????111 Therefore, virtual child pornography fell 
short of the harm-in-production logic of Ferber and this specific provision of the CPPA 
was held to be unconstitutionally broad.112
Even though the Supreme Court disagreed, the government strongly contended that 
virtual child pornography was worthy of inclusion in federal law.113 First, it could be used 
??? ??????????? ??? ???????? ??????????114 ???????? ????????? ?????? ???????????? ?????? ????
appetite of ped?????????115 Third, the objective of eliminating the market for child 
???????????? ?????????????? ?? ???????????? ??? ???????? ??????? ??? ??????116 Lastly, the 
?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ???
prosecute cases involving non-virtual child pornography.117 However, Ashcroft concluded 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the moral instincts of a decent people[,] . . . [t]he prospect of crime . . . by itself does not 
jus????????????????????????????????????????118 In other words, Ashcroft held that the link 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????119
Ashcroft did, in dicta, mention morphed child pornography. The Ashcroft Court only 
ruled on section 2256(8)(D) of the CPPA, which defined virtual child pornography.120
However, the Court did not touch section 2256(8)(C), which prohibits morphed child 
???????????? ??? ???????????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ????? ????????? ????????? ???
modified to appear ????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????121
The Court discussed this distinction in dicta, stating that images of real children edited so 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and are in that sense closer to the images in Ferber??122 In recent years, circuit courts have 
mined the meaning of those words.123
                                                          
109. Id. at 250. 
110. Id.
 111. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). 
112. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250, 256. 
113. Id. at 250. 
114. Id. at 251. 
115. Id. at 253. 
116. Id. at 254. 
117. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254. 
118. Id. at 244?45. 
119. Id. at 250. 
120. Id. at 242. 
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (emphasis added). 
122. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242. 
123. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 883 (6th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 
632 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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D. The Federal Circuit Courts and the Harms Caused by Morphed Child Pornography 
In United States v. Bach, the Eighth Circuit considered the constitutionality of 
section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPA.124 In Bach, the defendant was charged with possession 
of child pornography.125 ?????????????????????????????????? ???????????? ???????????????
of a well known juvenile . . . was skillfully inserted onto the body of the nude boy so that 
the resulting depiction appear[ed] to be a picture of [the well known juvenile] engaging in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????126 The defendant, relying on Ashcroft,
argued that the image did not involve the abuse of a real minor and therefore morphed 
images should not be included in the statute.127 Disagreeing, the court applied the words 
of section 2256(8)(C)128 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????129
The image depicted the child in a sexual manner because his face was pasted onto 
??????????????????????????????????????sitting in a tree in a lascivious pose with a full 
?????????? ???? ????? ???????? ???? ???? ??????? ??????? ????????130 However, even though this 
image was slightly different than the previously-mentioned examples of morphed child 
pornography (because the body used in the photo editing was not an adult body) the court 
determined that the interests implicated were of the child whose face was placed on the 
body.131 Even though the well-known child was not actually involved in the production 
of the image, he was an identifiable?actual?????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????132 ????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPPA incorporating morphed child pornography was affirmed 
as constitutional because ??? ?????????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ???? ?????????????? ?????
???????133
???? ??????? ???????? ???????? ???? ??????? ?????????? ?????????? ??? United States v. 
Hotaling.134 Here, the defendant created morphed child pornography by superimposing 
photos of the faces of six different young girls onto the bodies of nude adult females 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.135 One of the photos overlaid the face of a young 
girl onto a partially nude adult female who was handcuffed, shackled, wearing a collar and 
leash, and tied to a dresser.136 ????? ??? ???? ????????????? ????????????? ???? ????????????
daughter.137 The defendant contended that no child was harmed in the production of the 
                                                          
124. Bach, 400 F.3d at 630. 
125. Id. at 625. 
126. Id. at 632. 
127. Id. at 630. 
 128. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (?[S]uch visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that 
an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct.?). 





 134. United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 729?30 (2d Cir. 2011). 
135. Id. at 727. 
136. Id.
137. Id.
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photos, which were created only to record his mental fantasies.138 However, the Hotaling 
court held that morphed child pornography was rightly included in federal law because the 
????? ??????????????????? ???????? ? . . were at risk of reputational harm and suffered the 
psychological harm of knowing that their images were exploited and prepared for 
distribution by ?????????????????139 Stretching the Ferber definition of harm, the Hotaling
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????140 Therefore, 
the primary inquiry regarding the definition of child pornography is whether or not the 
?????? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ??? ??????? ???????141 The Hotaling court held that 
morphed child pornography does implicate such interests.142
Hotaling reasoned that while th??????????????????? ??????? ???? ?????? ?????????????
???????????? ????????????????? ????????????143 Furthermore, the real names of the young 
??????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
minor and the sexually explicit co???????144 The Hotaling court explicitly distinguished 
these morphed images from virtual child pornography because of the connection to actual 
children.145 However, while relying on the precedent of Ferber, the harms discussed in 
Hotaling were tweaked slightly from the harm-in-production logic. Hotaling stated that 
the harms associated with morphed images?reputational, emotional, and psychological?
are trigged the moment a child pornographer cuts and pastes the image of a child into a 
pornographic image.146 As a result, both the Eighth and Second Circuits categorized 
morphed child pornography within the terms found in section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPA and 
outside the protections of the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit would soon join. 
In Shoemaker v. Taylor, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Ashcroft Court left the issue 
of morphed child pornography and the First Amendment unresolved.147 Shoemaker stated 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
intere?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????148 Shoemaker
explained as follows: 
Morphed images of children engaged in sexual activity directly implicate the interest of 
protecting children from harm, an interest the Supreme Court deemed compelling in Ferber.
??????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ????? ??????? ????? ?? ??????????? ????????? ??? ?????????????? ????
physical and psychological well-??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????? ??? ??????????? ? . . The Court further noted that actual child pornography is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
138. Id.
139. Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730. 
140. Id. at 728. 
141. Id. at 729. 
142. Id. at 729?30 (stating, ?[w]e agree with the Eighth Circuit that the interests of actual minors are implicated 
when their faces are used in creating morphed images that make it appear that they are performing sexually 
explicit acts?). 
143. Id. at 730. 
144. Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730. 
145. Id.
146. Id.
 147. Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 2013). 
148. Id. at 786. 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????149
The Shoemaker court noted that the Ferber reasoning explains why the Second and Eighth 
Circuits also consider morphed child pornography not only within the statutory definition 
of section 2256(8)(C) of the CPPA but also outside First Amendment protections.150
?????????? ???????????????????n Doe v. Boland is particularly insightful. The morphed 
child pornography discussed in this case is almost identical to the two different examples 
of morphed child pornography previously discussed.151 In one, the defendant edited an 
innocent photo of a child eating a donut, replacing the donut with a picture of a penis.152
In another photo, the defendant placed the face of another child onto a photo of a nude 
woman engaging in sex acts with two other men.153 Initially the Boland court referenced 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????to protect 
????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????154 Because 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
interests??155 Boland concluded that the children in morphed child pornography are rightly 
??????????????????????????156 The defendant argued that the psychological harm implicated 
by morphed child pornography only materializes if or when the child victim becomes 
aware of the photo and experiences that harm upon viewing the image.157 However, the 
Boland ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????158
IV. OKLAHOMA LAW DANGEROUSLY IGNORES MORPHED CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY 
In view of the federal holdings, it is clear that morphed child pornography falls 
outside First Amendment protection and is prohibited by federal law. Federal courts have 
consistently supplied ample justification to view such images as harmful, triggering the 
need to protect the interest of children. However, differences between federal law and state 
law require a separate analysis to determine if morphed child pornography is similarly 
addressed at the state level. In other words, while the federal government has exposed 
morphed child pornography, it is the responsibility of the states to incorporate morphed 
images in their chosen definitions of child pornography. This section utilizes the different 
tools of statutory interpretation to show that morphed child pornography is likely not
prohibited by Oklahoma law. 
                                                          
149. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756?57, 759 (1982)). 
150. Id. at 786?87. 
 151. Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 879 (6th Cir. 2012). 
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 883 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759). 
155. Id. at 884 (quoting Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1)(7), 110 
Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2256). 
156. Boland, 698 F.3d at 883. 
157. Id. at 884. 
158. Id.
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 89 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 89 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
C M
Y K
BEACHAM, C - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2020 6:57 AM 
326 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:311 
A. Oklahoma’s Definition of Child Pornography
While the federal language defining child pornography specifically addresses 
morphed child pornography, it appears that the Oklahoma statute defining child 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or contained in any format on any medium including, but not limited to, film, motion picture, 
videotape, photograph, negative, undeveloped film, slide, photographic product, 
reproduction of a photographic product, play or performance wherein a minor under the age 
of eighteen (18) years is engaged in any act with a person, other than his or her spouse, of 
sexual intercourse which is normal or perverted, in any act of anal sodomy, in any act of 
sexual activity with an animal, in any act of sadomasochistic abuse including, but not limited 
to, flagellation or torture, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically 
restrained in the context of sexual conduct, in any act of fellatio or cunnilingus, in any act of 
excretion in the context of sexual conduct, in any lewd exhibition of the uncovered genitals 
in the context of masturbation or other sexual conduct, or where the lewd exhibition of the 
uncovered genitals, buttocks or, if such minor is a female, the breast, has the purpose of 
sexual stimulation of the viewer, or wherein a person under the age of eighteen (18) years 
observes such acts or exhibitions.159
The pertinent question is whether this language includes morphed images. It should be 
noted that this statute does not include the language found in federal definition defining 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????s been created, adapted, or modified to 
appear ????? ??? ????????????? ?????? ??? ????????? ??? ????????? ????????? ?????????160 These 
differences between the federal and Oklahoma statutes eliminate the possibility of leaning 
on the federal meaning to interpret Oklah?????? ??????? ?????????? ?????????????? ????
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals offers sparse help in interpretation because it has 
not yet decided a case involving these specific images. However, the court outlined a 
number of principles to facilitate the work of statutory interpretation, including: 
interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of the language, looking toward the legislative 
intent, reconciling provisions for a consistent interpretation, and staying within the 
boundaries established by the legislature.161 Therefore, a thorough explanation of the 
language, legislative intent, and other state interpretations will be helpful in construing 
???????????????????????????????????????????
1. The Plain Meaning 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated tha?? ????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????162 ??????????????????????
depiction or individual image . . . wherein a minor . . . is engaged in any act . . . of sexual 
????????????? ???? ????????????163 Do these words refer to actual engagement in sexual 
activity at the time the image is captured? Or, is the appearance of engaging in sexual 
                                                          
 159. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A) (emphasis added). 
 160. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (emphasis added). 
 161. State v. Young, 989 P.2d 949, 955 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999). 
162. Id.
 163. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A). 
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activity via manipulation also included? A plain interpretation leads to the former 
conclusion, excluding morphed child ???????????????????????????????????????
???? ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????164
However, morphed images only make it appear as though the child is engaged in sexual 
activity. As a result, it is correct to say that the children in morphed child pornography are 
not involved in the activity of sexual intercourse. Therefore, the plain meaning of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The federal statute does this by inserti??????????????????????????????????????????????????
definition.165 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exclude morphed child pornography. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be understood to include morphed images.166 Plainly speaking, morphed child 
pornography is a visual depiction of sexual activity. However, the syntax of the statute 
????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????image, not the content of the image. 
Di??????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ????? ??????? ?????????,?? ???? ???????? ?????? ???????? ??????????
???????????? ??????? ??????? ????????? ??????????? ???????????? ?????????? ???????????? ??????
slide, photographic product, reproduction of a photographic product, play or 
perfor???????167 ??????????? ????? ???? ????? ?????????? ??? ????????? ??? ??????? ????
relationship between the child and the image.168 ???????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
visual images that contain child pornography. 
Leaning upon the plain words of the statute, Oklahoma law requires an actual 
child?not merely an apparent child?to be engaged in sexual activity at the time the 
image is taken to qualify as child pornography. As is common, Oklahoma also includes 
???? ?????? ??????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ?????? ??? ???? ???????????169 These two 
possible qualifications?engagement in sexual activity or lewd nudity?certainly do not 
include morphed child pornography. As a result, the pl??????????????????????????????????
would not include images of actual and clothed children morphed to make it appear as 
though they are engaging in sexual activity. 
2. The Legislative Intent and Boundaries 
The legislative purpose undergirding chapter 39 of ??????????? ????????? ??????
where child pornography i?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????170
Unfortunately, this rationale is too broad to be helpful when interpreting the definition of 
child pornography in light of morphed images. Without a specific legislative statement, it 
is challenging to interpret the words of the statute differently than rendered by the plain 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
164. Engaged, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/engaged (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
 165. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C). 




 170. Arganbright v. State, 328 P.3d 1212, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014). 
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provides some insight into the words of the current definition. 
In 2000, the Oklahoma legislature added child pornography to the criminal code, 
separate and distinct from the obscenity provisions.171 The current language mirrors the 
2000 definition, although some minor alterations have been made.172 Interestingly, at the 
?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????portrayed, depicted, or represented
??? ????????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ??????? ?????????????173 Remarkably, this older obscenity 
language appears to include ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the past. However, when adding child pornography to the criminal code in 2000, the 
Oklahoma legislature did not borrow this language. Furthermore, the Oklahoma legislature 
has removed this language from the current definition of obscene materials, only including 
???????????? ??? ????????????? ??? ??????? ???????? ?????? ???? ????????? ???????????174 While 
morphed child pornography might fall within this current obscenity definition, the 
legislative history is not likely to support an inclusion of these images in the child 
pornography definition. The current definition, when crafted in 2000, did not use the most 
descriptive and clear language, which is only found in the old obscenity definition. As a 
result, the legislative history indicates either an intentional move away from incorporating 
morphed child pornography, or a choice that had the unintended and unrealized 
consequence of distancing morphed child pornography from Oklahoma law. 
Furthermore, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals stated that it is not 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
even if . . . the interpretation might produce a reasonable result. [The court] will not enlarge 
???? ?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????175
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the statute, it is evident t???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
include morphed images would violate the principles of statutory interpretation, putting 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
D. Other States and Morphed Child Pornography 
Unlike Oklahoma, other state courts have interpreted their child pornography 
statutes in light of morphed child pornography.176 In the three state cases discussed below, 
the courts found that morphed child pornography was not ???????????????????????????????????
statutory definition of child pornography. 
1. California: People v. Gerber
In 2008 a California father, Gerber, exposed his thirteen-year-old daughter, J., to 
                                                          
 171. 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws 795 (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1). 
172. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1 (2000) (amended 2012), with OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(A). 
 173. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1021.3 (2000) (emphasis added) (amended 2012). 
 174. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1024.1(B)(1)(a). 
 175. State v. Young, 989 P.2d 949, 955 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999). 
176. See, e.g., People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 386 (2011); Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 453?54 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 256?57 (N.H. 2008). 
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alcohol and drugs.177 After introducing her to cocaine, he offered her more cocaine if she 
would pose for a few photos.178 J. agreed.179 She was uncomfortable, because he 
instructed her to lean over, which revealed her cleavage.180 He reassured her that this was 
???????????????????181
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????? ???????????182 ?????????? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ??????? ??? ?? ???????????? ????
complied.183 He took various photos of J. in her bra and underwear.184 She was crying.185
Later that night she told her mother about the alcohol, drugs, and photos.186 The father 
was arrested.187
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????188 Gerber 
admitted to using Microsoft Paint to alter pornographic pictures of women he had collected 
??? ?????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ????? ???? ??????????? ?????189 This morphed child 
pornography, and not the photos of his daughter in her bra and underwear, were the focus 
of the case and criminal charge.190 In People v. Gerber, the California Court of Appeals 
reversed the conviction for possession of child pornography.191
The Gerber court addressed whether the morphed child pornography violated 
California law.192 The relevant California statute defined child pornography as an image 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????193 T??? ?????? ????? ????? ???? ??????????? ???????? ?????????? ?? ????? ?????? ??? ?????
????????? ???????? ??? ??? ?????????? ???? ??????? ???????? ??????????? ???????? ?????????? ????
conviction for possession of child pornography.194 The Gerber court disagreed with the 
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
photos because the photos do depict J. as the child engaged in sexual conduct.195 Instead, 
Gerber ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and the constitutional implications to hold differently.196 Because of the plain definition 
??? ????????????? ???? ???? ???????????? ????????? ???? ?????? ??????????? ????? ???????? ??????
                                                          
177. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 373, 374. 




182. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 375. 
183. Id.
184. Id. at 376. 
 185. Id.
186. Id.
 187. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 376. 
188. Id.
189. Id. at 377. 
 190. Id. at 378. 
191. Id. at 386. 
192. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 382. 
 193. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(a). 
194. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 371?72. 
195. Id. at 378. 
 196. Id.
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pornography was not banned by California law.197
Gerber leaned not only on the plain meaning of the California statute, but also on 
constitutional principles.198 ??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
about this interpretation by relying on Ashcroft.199 Gerber?unlike the federal circuit 
courts?distinguished the harm described in Ferber from the harm caused by morphed 
child pornography.200 Gerber noted that Ferber ????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the product of sexual abuse . . . does not fall outside the protection of the First 
???????????201 Therefore, the California Court of Appeals stated: 
[T]hat the articulated rationales underlying both the Ferber and [Ashcroft] decisions compel 
the conclusion that such altered materials are closer to virtual child pornography than to real 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ????? ??? ????????????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ???????????? ???????? ???????
exploitation of an actual child.202
Gerber generated calls for the amendment of California child pornography law.203
However, the current statute is unchanged since the Gerber decision.204
2. Florida: Parker v. State 
??? ???? ????? ????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ??? ???????? ??? ???????
published a similar opinion. The defendant, Parker, a Sunday school teacher, photographed 
many children.205 ?????? ???? ??????? ????? ??????? ???????? ????? ?????????? ???????
??????????206 Parker cut the heads off of the children in the photos and pasted them onto 
the bodies of nude, or partially nude, women engaged in sexual activity.207 He was charged 
and convicted of possession of child pornography.208 However, in Parker v. State, the 
????????????????????????? ?????????? ?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????d
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????209
Parker narrowed its focus to the applicable Florida statute that defined child 
?????????????????????????????? . . representation . . . or other presentation which, in whole 
or i?? ?????? ??? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???????? ???? ??????? ???????? ??? ?? ???????210 While this 
??????????? ????? ???? ???????? ???? ????? ?????????????? ????? ???? ??????????? ????????? Parker
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
197. Id. at 371. 
198. Id. at 383. 
199. Gerber, 196 Cal App. 4th at 383. 
200. Id. at 386. 
201. Id. at 385 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250?51 (2002)). 
202. Id. at 386. 
203. See generally Yamada, supra note 104, at 229, 231. 
204. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(a). 





 210. See Parker, 81 So. 3d at 453 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5)(a)) . 
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?????????211 Restrained by the words of the Florida legislature, the Parker court held that 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????212
Bolstering its decision, the Parker court also focused on the legislative intent behind 
the statute, which was concerned with the sexual exploitation of children.213 The court 
quoted language from 1983 in which the legislature expressed its concern in stopping the 
?????????????????????????????????????????214 Parker pointed out that the title of the statute 
???????????????????????215
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Parker court plainly stated that the federal statutes, and their interpretation by the circuit 
??????????????? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ??cision.216 However, Parker noted that if the Florida 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of photographs involved here, [the court is] confident that it can, and perhaps should, craft 
an appropriate statute??217 Therefore, Parker indicates that other state courts will handcuff 
their decision to the state statute, unable to rely on federal statute or precedent to reach the 
????????? ????? ??? ????????? ????????218 Like California, the legislature of Florida has not 
adopted a broader definition of child pornography since this decision.219
3. New Hampshire: State v. Zidel
In State v. Zidel the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed a conviction for the 
possession of morphed child pornography.220 However, unlike the previous cases from 
California and Florida, the Zidel court focused primarily on the constitutional issues 
already addressed at the federal level.221 Disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit in Bach,
Zidel held that criminalizing the possession of morphed child pornography was an 
unconstitutional overstep by New Hampshire state law.222 In its emphasis on federal 
precedent, rather than on state statutory interpretation, Zidel ?????????????????????????????
harms results to the child [who] . . ?? ??? ?????????? ??? ???????? ?????? ?ornography.223
Therefore, because the court held morphed child pornography was not intrinsically related 
to the sexual abuse of children, the conviction could not stand.224
Therefore, whether states have focused on the interpretation of state statutes (like 
California and Florida) or leaned on constitutional arguments (like New Hampshire), the 
trend is for state courts to find that morphed child pornography is not included in the state 
                                                          
211. Id. at 453. 
212. Id.
213. Id. at 454. 
214. Id.
215. Parker, 81 So. 3d at 455. 
216. Id. at 455. 
217. Id. at 457 (emphasis added). 
218. Id.
 219. FLA. STAT. § 827.071(5)(a). 
 220. State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 265 (N.H. 2008). 
221. Id. at 257. 
222. Id. at 265. 
223. Id. at 263. 
224. Id. at 264. 
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 92 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 92 Side B      03/03/2020   13:59:43
C M
Y K
BEACHAM, C - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2020 6:57 AM 
332 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:311 
definitions of child pornography.225 This tendency, coupled with the plain meaning of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
images are not considered child pornography under Oklahoma law. 
V. THE NEED TO INCLUDE MORPHED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN OKLAHOMA
LAW 
It is incumbent on any decent society to value and protect children because of their 
intrinsic worth. This value, which flows from the inherent dignity of humanity, calls for a 
public policy that protects children from those who might cause them harm. Morphed child 
pornography causes harm, exploits children as sexual objects, and violates basic notions 
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
legal definition of child pornography. 
A. Morphed Child Pornography Harms and Exploits Children 
The harm connected to traditional images of child pornography is self-evident.226
This relationship between traditional child pornography and child sexual abuse is so 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
production and possession.227 Therefore, child pornography is detrimental to children and
societies, because it attacks the very core of flourishing healthy communities?
children.228 This link makes clear that traditional images of child pornography are 
repulsive, an???????????????????????????????????229 In fact, the connection between child 
pornography and child sexual abuse is so well-defined that multiple organizations and 
???????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????? ????????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????230
The harm of child sexual abuse is the bedrock of Ferber’s reasoning to remove child 
pornography from First Amendment protections.231 But this direct harm-in-production 
was not the only harm discussed by Ferber. The Ferber Court also described the derivative 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????232 Ferber connected the harm-in-production to the harm-in-
circulation through an economic argument, holding that the market which fuels child 
sexual abuse would dry if the circulation of images were banned.233 It is this connection 
between the sexual abuse and the harm-in-circulation that poses a problem for the 
                                                          
225. See, e.g., People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 371?72 (2011); Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 453?
54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Zidel, 940 A.2d at 265. 
 226. OST, supra note 47, at 104. 
227. Id.
 228. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982). 
 229. O?DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 69. 
 230. Mary Graw Leary, The Language of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation, in REFINING CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 109, 133 (Carissa Byrne Hessick ed., 
2016); see also National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Sexual Abuse Imagery: Overview,
http://www.missingkids.com/theissues/sexualabuseimagery (last visited Mar. 16, 2019). 
 231. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 (stating that ?[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children 
constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance?). 
 232. Id. at 759. 
 233. Id. at 760. 
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criminalization of morphed child pornography. While Ferber recognized that the harm of 
child pornography goes beyond sexual abuse, those extended harms caused by circulation 
and possession are still connected to the sexual abuse of children.234 Therefore, if the 
extended harms of child pornography are unconnected to actual sexual abuse of children, 
do the justifications also drop away?235
The Osborne Court was the first to describe a harm more attenuated than physical 
sexual abuse. Osborne reasoned that possession of child pornography caused harm 
because the evidence showed that pedophiles used it to seduce other children.236 This new 
argument untethered the harm caused by child pornography from the foundational harm 
of sexual abuse and pointed toward a harm tied to the potential abuse of children through 
pornographic seduction.237 In other words, the harm of child pornography was not 
connected only to the creation of child pornography but also to its mere existence.238
However, Ashcroft attempted to retie the knot between child pornography and child sexual 
abuse. The Ashcroft Court rejected criminalizing virtual child pornography by quashing 
????????????????? ??????????? ????? ?????? ????????????????????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ???
engage in sexual activity, that they might whet the appetites of pedophiles, and that they 
might increase the market for actual child pornography.239 While protecting children from 
sexual abuse is a valid use of the law, Ashcroft ??????? ????? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????
however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing pro???????????????240
Yet, Ashcroft did not totally dismiss the potential harm caused by morphed child 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in that sense closer to the images in Ferber??241 This announcement from the Supreme 
Court shows a strong federal belief that morphed images do in fact harm the interests of 
children. And here, caught between traditional images of child pornography (which are 
the product of sexual violence against children) and virtual child pornography (which 
involve no actual sexual violence against children), morphed child pornography poses a 
unique analytical problem.242
The federal circuit courts, leaning on Ashcroft??? ??????? ????????? ?? ????? ?????
morphed child pornography does cause harm and is worthy of inclusion in the law.243 The 
Ninth Circuit held in Bach that morphed images harm the psychological well-being of 
????????? ???? ????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ????? ??????????244 Hotaling noted the 
                                                          
 234. Id. at 759. 
 235. Weinstein, supra note 80, at 45. 
 236. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
 237. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Setting Definitional Limits for the Child Pornography Exception, in REFINING 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 57, 61 (Carissa Byrne Hessick 
ed., 2016). 
 238. Id.
 239. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). 
240. Id. at 245; Hessick, supra note 237, at 61 (writing that ?[t]he Ashcroft Court also left no doubt that the 
harm in creation is the touchstone of its child pornography doctrine?). 
241. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 242. 
 242. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 20. 
243. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Taylor, 730 F.3d 778, 786 (9th Cir. 2013); Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 884 (6th 
Cir. 2012); United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 
632 (8th Cir. 2005). 
244. Bach, 400 F.3d at 632. 
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exploitive nature and reputational harm triggered by morphed images.245 Shoemaker
highlighted the sexual exploitation, psychological harm, and reputational harm that 
morphed child pornography imposes on children.246 Boland even comments on the 
????????????????????????????????? ????????mages.247 However, no singular theory of the 
harm caused by morphed child pornography has been established. While the central harm 
of actual sexual abuse is not implicated by morphed images, the other harms noted by the 
federal courts are plentiful. And still, the circuit courts boldly utilize these harms, 
unconnected to actual sexual abuse, as a justification to include morphed images in the 
federal definition of child pornography.248
Shoemaker ?????????? ???? ????? ?????? ??? ???????? ?????? ???????????? ??? ????????
e?????????????249 While it is certainly true that morphed images are those which only make 
it appear ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????250 This exploitation causes psychological harm to a child with the 
knowledge that their image was used as an instrument of sexual gratification.251 It is 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a pedophile is using their image as masturbatory material. Even if some victims of 
morphed child pornography are unaware that their photo is being manipulated for a 
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????252
Furthermore, the harms produced by this sexual exploitation are not limited to the 
psychological. Whether or not a child becomes aware that their face and/or body is the 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
the pornographer is taking unfair advantage of a child, using them as ?? ??????? ??? ???
?????253 This exploitative harm violates sexual autonomy and personhood.254
This distinction between the harms of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation was 
acknowledged on the international level. Article 34 of the UN Convention on the Right of 
t???????????????????????????? ???????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
???? ??????? ???????255 ??????? ????? ???????????? ?????????????? ???????? ??????????????? ????
????????256 This distinction supports the argument that morphed child pornography is 
harmful, and worthy of inclusion in Oklahoma law, because of the exploitation of the 
children who are used to create these pornographic images. It is this exploitation and the 
harms which ensue that are consistently mentioned in the federal circuit courts. 
However, some commentators have rejected the justification of these types of harm, 
                                                          
245. Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730. 
246. Shoemaker, 730 F.3d at 786. 
247. Boland, 698 F.3d at 881. 
248. See, e.g., Shoemaker, 730 F.3d at 786; Boland, 698 F.3d at 884; Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 730; Bach, 400 
F.3d at 632; Leary, supra note 230, at 133. 
249. Shoemaker, 730 F.3d at 786. 
 250. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 3. 
 251. Suzanne Ost, Criminalising Fabricated Images of Child Pornography: A Matter of Harm or Morality?,
30 LEGAL STUD. 230, 241 (2010). 
252. Id.
 253. OST, supra note 47, at 119; see also Boland, 698 F.3d at 884. 
 254. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 100. 
 255. G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Sept. 2, 1990). 
256. Id.
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????257 However, this commenta??????
focus is primarily on sexting images and not morphed images.258 Still, without a direct 
link between the morphed images and the sexual abuse of children, some have defended 
excluding morphed images from the category of child pornography.259 Relying on harm 
of actual sexual abuse, it is possible to believe that the other harms implicated by morphed 
child pornography are not sufficient and are unconnected to sexual abuse at the time of 
production to render these images illegal.260 Nevertheless, a disconnection between 
morphed images and sexual child abuse does not negate the harms of sexual exploitation, 
potential psychological harm, or the possible reputational harm used by the many federal 
courts previously mentioned. While these harms are certainly different than the one 
connected to other types of child pornography, simply saying that the link is weak does 
not effectively render the argument void.261
Furthermore, while the link between morphed child pornography and child sexual 
abuse is more attenuated than traditional child pornography, it is certainly more associated 
than the virtual child pornography discussed in Ashcroft. Morphed images, as the Hotaling
?????????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ???????? ??????????? ??? ???????????262 Often the young 
victims of these mental fantasies are children in direct contact with the pedophile. More 
than half of the cases previously discussed in this article expose direct connections 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????mp 
photographer and camp students, a Sunday school teacher and Sunday school students, 
and a father and daughter.263 The mental fantasies of pedophiles in morphed child 
pornography visually represent a lust for children known by the pornographer. Therefore, 
the sexual exploitation involved in morphed child pornography is eerily intimate in nature. 
Another minority view espouses a beneficial purpose to morphed child pornography 
because these images could potentially help pedophiles facilitate an outlet for their disease, 
protecting real children from sexual abuse.264 Here the notion of harm is flipped, and it is 
argued that these images might actually lead to less harm.265 However, there is little 
evidence that this is correct.266 Additionally, this argument is severely flawed. Because 
virtual child pornography is not illegal, the hypothetically positive effects could be realized 
with images of computer-generated children, not actual children with real interests to 
protect. As a result, none of these counter-arguments are convincing and the case for 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
 257. Hessick, supra note 237, at 58. 
258. Id. at 70?72. 
259. See id. at 73. 
 260. Id., at 67. 
 261. Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child-Pornography? The Dialog Continues – Structured 
Prosecutorial Discretion Within a Multidisciplinary Response, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL?Y & L. 486, 522 (2010). 
 262. United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 727 (2nd Cir. 2011). 
263. Id.; People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 373 (2011); Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 452 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2011); State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 256 (N.H. 2008). 
 264. Katherine Williams, Child Pornography Law: Does It Protect Children?, 26 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM.
L. 245, 253 (2011). 
265. Id.
 266. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 41. 
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B. Morphed Child Pornography Violates Human Dignity 
???????? ?????? ???????????? ?????????? ???? ???????? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????
???????267 Therefore, to legalize morphed child pornography would be to legalize the 
violation of fundamental human rights and autonomy. Perhaps this is why Ferber noted 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or pro???????????268 Children in morphed child pornography suffer an injury beyond 
physical or psychological harm.269 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????? ?????? ???? ???????? ??????? ???? ????? ?????? ???????????? ????? ???? ????????
inherent right ??????????????????the freedom to not be viewed in such a sexualized and 
vulnerable position.270 This idea is related to Ferber ??????? ?????? ????????????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????271
This argument is consistent with the logical division between adult pornography and 
child pornography. As previously mentioned, lack of consent plays a significant role in the 
understanding of child pornography. In traditional child pornography the child has not?
and cannot?consent to sexual activity. In morphed child pornography, the child has not?
and cannot?consent to their sexualization in order to gratify the sexual appetites of adults. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and encoura?????????????????????????????????????????????????????272 Objectifying children 
to satisfy the desires of adults can only encourage those who commit actual child sexual 
abuse.273
Furthermore, humans share an inherent interest in protecting their likeness from 
improper use, an interest which is also found in other areas of the law.274 The Geneva 
Convention bans photographs of prisoners of war that subject them to humiliation or public 
curiosity.275 The Supreme Court ruled that there is a right of privacy over death-scene 
images of a loved one.276 Even tort law limits images of certain death and autopsy 
photos.277 This interest in protecting private images applies to children, who have a right 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
definition of child pornography.278
These notions of human dignity and privacy are also implicated in the current 
??????????? ?????????? ??????????? ???????????? ??????? ????? ????? ???????? ??????
pornography, embeds the faces of innocent women onto adult actors in pornography 
                                                          
 267. Audrey Rogers, The Dignitary Harm of Child Pornography—From Producers to Possessors, in REFINING 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 165, 166 (Carissa Byrne Hessick 
ed., 2016). 
 268. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982). 
 269. Rogers, supra note 267, at 177. 
270. Id.; Ost, supra note 251, at 241. 
271. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10. 
 272. O?DONNELL & MILNER, supra note 6, at 74. 
 273. OST, supra note 47, at 105. 
 274. Rogers, supra note 267, at 177. 
 275. Id.; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 276. Nat?l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 170 (2004); Rogers, supra note 267, at 178. 
277. Favish, 541 U.S. at 169; Rogers, supra note 267, at 178. 
 278. OST, supra note 47, at 128. 
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videos.279 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????this icky 
???????????????????280 A Washington Post article states that these pornographic materials 
???? ????????????? ???????? ??????? ???????? ?????????????? ??????????? ???? ???????281
????????? ??????????? ?? ?????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ??? ??????????? ????????????? ???????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? body and making it 
look as eerily realistic as desired . . . . [T]rying to protect yourself from the Internet and its 
?????????????????????????????????????282 But Ms. Johansson is wrong. At the federal level, 
children are protected from this type of violation of human dignity because legal 
definitions of child pornography include morphed images. However, without including 
morphed child pornography in the definition of child pornography, attempting to protect 
children from this type of abuse, as Ms. Johansson laments, is a lost cause. 
C. Morphed Child Pornography Is Repugnant to Public Policy 
Perhaps the reason the federal circuit courts have so diligently affirmed the federal 
definition of child pornography is the desire to protect children from something blatantly 
repugnant. Whether it is this unspoken rationale, or a stand-alone justification, the moral 
and ethical connections to morphed child pornography impact public policy. In fact, 
England and Wales have a strong moral rationale behind their child pornography 
legislation.283 Some scholars have noted the direct link between morality and the law,284
even stating that the American Revolution was fueled by many things including the belief 
?????????????????? ??????? ??????????????????? ????????285 The belief was that the king acted 
unfairly, violating human rights.286 As a practical example, the Thirteenth Amendment is 
an instance when the government took a moral stand by banning slavery.287
The idea that children should be protected from sexualization is consistent with 
deeply-rooted public policy. Certainly, the moral fabric of American society demands the 
protection of children from people who would abuse them. The prevention of sexual 
exploitation of children constitutes an objective of surpassing importance.288 Child 
pornography laws themselves reveal this strongly held desire to guard the most precious 
and vulnerable persons in society. 
????????? ????? ??????? ????? ??????????????? ???????????? ???? ??????? ????? ???? ????????
without abusing or exploiting a child transforms child pornography law into a system for 
                                                          
 279. Drew Harwell, Fake-Porn Videos Are Being Weaponized to Harass and Humiliate Women: “Everybody 






 283. GILLESPIE, supra note 22, at 9; Williams, supra note 264, at 255. 




287. Id. at 23. 
 288. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982). 
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????????????????????????????289 Others disagree completely.290 One commentator even 
stated that morality is an appropriate foundation for banning these images.291 Therefore, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????, poses a threat to the moral fiber of 
???????????????????????????????????????????292
But public policy and strong convictions without meaningful representation in the 
law is of little value. It is one thing to believe that children should not be exploited by 
pedophiles, but it is another for the law to add meaningful weight behind this conviction. 
The harms caused by morphed child pornography accentuate the need to protect children. 
Sexual exploitation, psychological harm, and violations of human dignity and privacy 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
vulnerable and defenseless in society.293 Public policy, undergirded by strong moral 
convictions, properly calls for the inclusion of morphed child pornography in Oklahoma 
law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With the constitutional issues previously handled at the federal level, the good 
people of Oklahoma have the right to protect their children from pornographers who 
exploit children by including in their statute a definition of child pornography that 
incorporates morphed child pornography. Because morphed child pornography is not 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are worthy of prosecution, the Oklahoma legislature should update state law to protect 
children. The legislature can adopt language from either the current federal statute or reach 
back into Oklahoma legislative history and use the language that previously defined 
obscenity before it was changed. 
With the intent to protect children from the harms of morphed child pornography, 
and in light of our deeply-rooted value in protecting children, the new statute should define 
???????????????????????????????????????????? . . wherein a minor under the age of eighteen 
(18) y???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
–Caleb Beacham*
                                                          
 289. Hessick, supra note 237, at 73. 
 290. Williams, supra note 264, at 254. 
291. Id. (?[T]he reasoning for the law must fall back on the protection of sexual morality; the desire to prevent 
people obtaining sexual gratification, even if it does not interfere with the rights of children (especially in the 
case of pseudo-images, where children are not used in the creation of the image), merely because most people 
consider that viewing such images is abhorrent.?). 
 292. OST, supra note 47, at 120. 
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